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Abstract
Peer-to-peer sanctions increase cooperation in multi-person social
dilemmas (Fehr & Ga¨chter (2000)), but not when subjects have the op-
tion to retaliate (Nikiforakis (2008)). One-shot peer-to-peer rewards
have been found to enhance efficiency too (Vyrastekova & van Soest
(2008), Rand et al. (2009a)), but it is an open question whether the
positive impact on cooperation is weakened or strengthened when we
allow for counterrewarding. We examine the impact of possible reci-
procity in rewarding on cooperation in a non-linear public bad game,
and find that efficiency in the social dilemma is equally low as absent
any reward options. We hypothesize that subjects are unwilling to
sever mutually profitable bilateral exchanges of reward tokens to in-
duce cooperation in the social dilemma, and identify the underlying
mechanism by comparing behavior across three matching protocols.
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1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, many economic experiments have been conducted
to assess the relative effectiveness of self-regulatory instruments in sustain-
ing cooperation in multi-person social dilemma situations, such as linear
public good games and non-linear public bad games. Instruments tested
in laboratory experiments include ostracism (Masclet (2003), Maier-Rigaud
et al. (2010)), peer-to-peer rewards (Sefton et al. (2007), Vyrastekova &
van Soest (2008), Rand et al. (2009a)), and verbal expressions of approval
or disapproval (Masclet et al. (2003)). Most attention, however, has been
paid to the effectiveness of peer-to-peer punishments; see for example Ya-
magishi (1988), Ostrom et al. (1992), and Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000, 2002).
Offering subjects the opportunity to impose (monetary) sanctions on their
peers significantly increases the efficiency of public good provision, and this
is even the case if punishments are not only costly to the punished, but also
to the subject imposing them (Ga¨chter et al. (2008)). To economists, these
results are surprising because the experimental games are set up such that
subjects should not be willing to provide the second-order public good of
punishing free-riders in any of the periods, and hence efficiency in the social
dilemma should be equally low with and without the opportunity to impose
punishments.
The external validity (or real world relevance) of the experimental pun-
ishment mechanism results has been challenged on two grounds. The first
is that ‘sticks’ may not be used so eagerly if there is an opportunity for
revenge. Nikiforakis (2008) conducted a public good game experiment with
two punishment stages rather than just one, so that subjects can use the
second punishment stage to directly reciprocate to any sanctions received in
the first. The consequences are quite dramatic. Faced with the threat of po-
tential retaliation hardly any sanctions are imposed in the first punishment
stage, and hence the efficiency in the multi-person social dilemma stage does
not differ from the efficiency level that materializes absent any punishment
stages.1 Hence, peer-to-peer punishments may be able to sustain coopera-
1See Denant-Boemont et al. (2007) and Nikiforakis & Engelmann (2011) for additional
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tion in the real world, but only if punishers can hide their identity to those
being punished (see also Rand et al. (2009a)).
The second criticism regarding the real-world relevance of peer-to-peer
punishments is that in most societies, the use of force is the exclusive right
of the government: typically, individual citizens are allowed to neither im-
pose physical nor monetary punishments on their peers (Vyrastekova & van
Soest (2008)). That means that peer-to-peer rewards may be empirically
more relevant than peer-to-peer punishments, and a relatively small litera-
ture has emerged analyzing the effectiveness of rewards in sustaining coop-
eration (Sefton et al. (2007), Vyrastekova & van Soest (2008), Rand et al.
(2009a), and Sutter et al. (2010)). When using the same design features as
the standard punishment experiment, rewards are observed to increase co-
operation in the social dilemma stage if and only if the benefits of receiving
a reward are larger than the costs of giving it — but less so than in case of
punishments.
This paper contributes to the literature on the effectiveness of the re-
ward mechanism in sustaining cooperation in multi-person social dilemmas
by exploring to what extent offering subjects the opportunity to counter-
reward increases or decreases the mechanism’s effectiveness. While indi-
vidual agents generally have strong incentives to hide their identity in case
they punish another agent in a social dilemma, the opposite holds in case
of rewards; the benefactor usually has good reasons to reveal her identity
to the recipient. Also, in most real-world social dilemmas agents are likely
to be well aware of the history of (at least a subset of) their fellow agents’
behavior in the social dilemma as well as of the history of whom they re-
ceived ‘rewards’ from (in the form of gifts, but possibly also in the form of
help minding one’s children, help with crop harvesting, etc.); see also Rand
et al. (2009a). Do rewards improve efficiency in the social dilemma in such
a setting, even when subjects can reciprocate to rewards received before?
To answer this question, we analyze the behavior of subjects in a finitely
repeated game. In every period, subjects first decide on their investments
analyses of the underlying mechanism. For a cross-cultural analysis of the factors inducing
subjects to engage in retaliation (or anti-social punishment), see Hermann et al. (2008).
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in a standard non-linear public bad game, after which they can decide how
many reward tokens (of a limited budget) they send to each of the four other
members of their group. The costs of sending a reward token are smaller
than the benefits of receiving one, so bilaterally exchanging reward tokens is
a profitable enterprize by itself. As is the case in many real world instances,
the design allows each subject to base her reward decisions not only on
her fellow group members’ behavior in the multi-person social dilemma in
the current period, but also on the number of reward tokens she received
from them in previous reward stages. That means that we use the so-called
Partner Fixed (PF) matching protocol, where Partner refers to the fact that
group composition remains unchanged throughout the experiment, while
Fixed refers to the fact that each subject receives a unique identity label
that is constant throughout the experiment too.
We hypothesize that rewards may not be able to sustain cooperation
in the social dilemma. If subjects can condition their decision to send re-
ward tokens not just on (the history of) their peers’ behavior in the social
dilemma but also on (the history of) rewards received, which of the two
— if any — will they reciprocate to? Or, stated otherwise, are subjects
willing to potentially jeopardize a mutually profitable (bilateral) exchange
of reward tokens by withholding rewards if another agent decides to act less
cooperatively in the social dilemma? If subjects do not view the decrease in
the number of reward tokens received as a just punishment for their acting
less cooperatively in the social dilemma stage, they may retaliate by with-
holding rewards too. In that sense, withholding rewards can be viewed as
a second-order public good, and the question is whether or not subjects are
willing to provide it.
We test this hypothesis using two different treatments. One is a treat-
ment in which every social dilemma stage (the non-linear public bad game)
is followed by a single reward stage, the 1SR-PF treatment (where 1SR
refers to the fact that there is just one reward stage in every period, and
where PF indicates that we use the Partner Fixed matching protocol). The
second treatment is a game in which a period consists of a social dilemma
stage followed by two reward stages (rather than just one). This game cap-
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tures the idea that in the real world the frequency with which rewards can
be exchanged may well be higher than the frequency in which agents make
decisions regarding their behavior in social dilemmas (or the frequency with
which they receive information on the behavior of their peers in these social
dilemma situations). We refer to this experimental game as the 2SR-PF
treatment, as the matching protocol remains Partner Fixed.
To date many social dilemma experiments have been run, and our setup
is closest to the designs implemented by Vyrastekova & van Soest (2008) and
Rand et al. (2009a). As is the case in our experiment, rewards are ‘efficiency
enhancing’ in these two studies in that the payoffs of the recipient of a re-
ward increase by three points while the costs of giving it are just one point.
Our study differs from these two because we offer subjects two opportunities
for rewarding in every period rather than just one so that they can ‘coun-
terreward’. In addition, our study improves on that by Vyrastekova & van
Soest (2008) by allowing subjects to condition their rewarding decisions on
the complete history of play (by implementing the Partner Fixed matching
protocol, as is also done by Rand et al. (2009a)) rather than just on social
dilemma play in the current period. And while Rand et al. (2009a) constrain
their subjects’ choice space to the decision, vis-a-vis each fellow subject, to
give him a reward, yes or no, subjects have complete freedom in rewarding
in our design. They can choose to give no rewards, to spread them equally,
or to give them all to one fellow group member — or anything in between.
That means that subjects do not need to solicit the cooperation of all other
group members to obtain the maximum benefits from bilateral cooperation
— selecting only a few partners (or maybe just one) to exchange reward
tokens with may suffice.
When designing the experiment, we expected the results of the analysis
to be sensitive to whether we would allow for two or just one reward stage per
period. We hypothesized that rewards may be able to sustain cooperation
in the 1SR-PF treatment but not in the 2SR-PF treatment because the
second reward stage might shift our subjects’ attention away from their
peers’ behavior in the social dilemma and towards their behavior in the
rewarding stages. These predictions did not play out in practice, however, as
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behavior in the social dilemma stage was very similar in the two treatments
— rewards are found to be unable to increase efficiency in the social dilemma
above that achieved absent any reward options, independent of whether
there is one reward stage, or two.
While both Vyrastekova & van Soest (2008) and Rand et al. (2009a)
find that rewards can sustain cooperation in social dilemma situations, we
thus come to the exact opposite conclusion. Even though in our experiment
the average number of reward tokens sent by each subject is high and even
increasing as the game progresses (as is the case in Rand et al. (2009a)), effi-
ciency in the non-linear public bad game is low — even lower than predicted
by standard game theory. Indeed, we find that subjects establish relation-
ships with one another in which each partner systematically sends reward
tokens to the other. These mutually profitable partnerships are formed early
on in the experiment and are long-lasting. We also find that the establish-
ment of these connections is largely independent of the partners’ behavior in
the social dilemma in the early periods of the experiment. Hence, subjects
reciprocate to rewards received — not to their peers’ behavior in the social
dilemma.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the two
experimental games that make up the main treatments of this experiment,
as well as the three matching protocols implemented. In section 3 we present
the data for the 2SR-PF sessions as this matching protocol is empirically
the most relevant one. In section 4 we present the results of the other two
matching protocols, as they provide additional support for our claim that
rewards are not likely to be effective in sustaining cooperation in real-world
social dilemmas when agents can reap the full benefits of the exchange of
rewards by forming long-lasting partnerships with just a limited number of
fellow community members. We explain why our conclusions are opposite to
those obtained by Vyrastekova & van Soest (2008) and Rand et al. (2009a)
in the concluding section 5.
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2 The game and experimental procedure
In this section we present the experimental design. Section 2.1 presents the
model, and section 2.2 describes the experimental procedure.
2.1 The experimental game
In line with the game developed by Ostrom et al. (1992), we implement
a non-linear public bad game with N > 1 identical players. The game
is repeated T ≥ 1 times, and in every period t = 1, . . . , T each player
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} can allocate a fixed amount of ‘effort’, e, between a social
dilemma activity and an alternative economic activity, the outside option.
We use xi,t to denote the amount of effort player i puts into the social
dilemma activity in period t, where xi,t is an integer number between 0 and e.
The marginal return on the amount of effort allocated to the outside option,
e − xi,t ≥ 0, is constant and equal to w. The private marginal benefits of
effort allocated to the social dilemma activity are equal to A−BXt, where
Xt ≡ ∑Ni=1 xi,t. The baseline game consists of one stage only, the social
dilemma stage, which we will refer to with superscript s1. Player i’s total
payoffs in stage s1 of period t are thus equal to:
pis1i,t = w(e− xi,t) + [A−BXt]xi,t. (1)
Because ∂pis1i,t/∂xj,t < 0 for all j 6= i, this game is a (non-linear) public
bad game. If T = 1, the symmetric individual Nash effort level is xNE =
(A−w)/B(N+1), while the socially optimal individual effort level is equal to
xSO = (A−w)/2BN . Since xNE > xSO if N > 1, there is a social dilemma.
If the game is repeated a finite number of times (T ≥ 2), the standard
game-theoretic prediction is that all players choose the Nash equilibrium
effort xNE in all periods 1, . . . , T . Using backward induction, if it does not
pay to cooperate in the last period of a finitely repeated game, it does not
pay to cooperate in any previous period either.
The game described above captures a social dilemma in which there are
no instruments to affect the behavior of one’s peers other than one’s own
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social dilemma effort level. Hence it serves as a baseline against which we
can test the impact of players having the opportunity to reward their peers.
We refer to this baseline game as 0SR, reflecting that there are zero reward
stages in this game.
The game that allows for rewarding is modeled as follows. The first
stage (s1) in this game is identical to the (first) stage of the baseline game
(0SR), and hence a player’s payoffs in this stage are given by equation (1).
The social dilemma stage is then followed by either one reward stage, s2 or
by two (identical) reward stages, s2 and s3. We will refer to these games
as 1SR and 2SR, respectively, reflecting that these games have either one
reward stage, or two. A reward stage is set up as follows. Each of the N
players receive z reward tokens which she can keep herself, or give to one
or more of her fellow group members. Every token that the player keeps,
increases her payoffs by 1 point. Every token that is sent to a fellow group
member, increases that group member’s payoffs by r points, where r > 1.
Note that while this assumption seems restrictive, it likely to be met in
many different situations (see Vyrastekova & van Soest (2008), and Rand et
al. (2009a, 2009b)). ‘Rewards’ can be thought of as gifts (financial, in kind,
or time) that increase the recipient’s welfare. People’s marginal valuation of
objects may well differ, and their marginal valuation of money can differ too.
And time constraints may also result in people valuing time differently; if
community members undertake, say, agriculture in addition to being active
in fishing at a lake (the social dilemma activity), rewards can take the form
of assisting a fellow community member getting his harvest of the land in
time. If not all crops are ready for harvest at the same time, time constraints
differ between community members, and so do their marginal values of time.
Hence, the recipient’s valuation of the ‘reward’ may well be higher than the
provisioning cost incurred by the benefactor.
So, we assume that r > 1, and player i’s payoffs in stage s (s = {s2} in
1SR, s = {s2, s3} in 2SR) in period t are given by:
pisi,t = z −
∑
j 6=i
psij,t + r
∑
j 6=i
psji,t, (2)
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where psij,t is the number of reward tokens that player i sends to player j
(j 6= i) in stage s in period t. Hence, the total individual payoffs in period t
of the 1SR and 2SR game are pi1SRi,t = pi
s1
i,t+pi
s2
i,t and pi
2SR
i,t = pi
s1
i,t+pi
s2
i,t+pi
s3
i,t,
respectively.
Aggregate payoffs are maximized if all players (i) choose effort level
xSO = (A−w)/2BN in every period, and (ii) always send all their z reward
tokens in both reward stages to their fellow group members, because r > 1.
The standard game-theoretic predictions are, however, that no reward to-
kens are sent in either s2 or s3 in any period of 2SR (i.e., ps2ij,t = p
s3
ij,t = 0
for all j 6= i, and for all t = {1, . . . , T}). Applying backward induction
there is no reason for a selfish player to send reward tokens in s3 of period
T , and hence there is no reason to send reward tokens in stage s2 of that
period either. If all players are selfish, there is also no reason to choose
any effort level other than the Nash equilibrium one, xNE , in period T , and
hence there are no reasons to send reward tokens in either of the two reward
stages in period T − 1 either. That means that the game unravels, and
efficiency in the social dilemma activity (s1) is equal to the non-cooperative
level independent of whether or not players have the opportunity to send
reward tokens. And the same reasoning holds for 1SR, giving rise to the
same game-theoretic prediction that the Nash equilibrium obtains in every
stage and in all periods.
According to social orientation tests, only about 30 percent of humans
behave consistently with the assumption of ‘homo economicus’ in labora-
tory experiments; see for example Fischbacher et al. (2001). Altruists may
be willing to always give rewards, because it gives rise to warm glow and/or
because it increases group welfare; conditional cooperators may use the re-
ward stages ‘properly’ by giving rewards to those players who act cooper-
atively in the social dilemma stage. Thus, if players are endowed with a
richer set of preferences than homo economicus, the above standard game-
theoretic predictions may be refuted. It may also be the case that players
are predominantly interested in their own material welfare, but that the
above predictions do not play out because players realize that others may
be willing to reciprocate to rewards received (see ?). Hence, they may decide
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to establish bilateral ties of cooperation by exchanging reward tokens rather
than to use the reward tokens to sustain cooperation in the social dilemma.
In real world social dilemmas agents typically have good knowledge of
the (past and present) behavior of (at least a subset of) their fellow com-
munity members in the social dilemma activity, and also whether and from
whom they received ‘rewards’ (in the form of gifts, or help) in the present
and past. That means that from the range of matching protocols typically
used in economic experiments, the Partner Fixed protocol is the most plau-
sible one. In this matching protocol, group membership does not change
throughout the experimental session, and also identity labels remain fixed
not only within but also between periods. In this setup, all of the above rea-
sons to send reward tokens may materialize, and we can assess the net result
of their interaction by comparing the efficiency in the social dilemma stage
in the 1SR and 2SR treatments to that in the 0SR treatment. To have an
adequate benchmark, participants play either the 0SR and 1SR treatments
or the 0SR and 2SR treatments sequentially in every Partner Fixed (PF)
session, with 0SR being played first.
However, we can gain additional insight into the relevance of the various
uses of reward tokens by having players play the game using two alternative
matching protocols. In one, group composition remains constant throughout
the experiment but identity labels are randomly changed between periods
(Partner Random, PR). In sessions with this PR matching protocol, players
cannot base their reward decisions on whether or not they received rewards
from a specific fellow group member in the past, but they can use their
reward tokens to encourage fellow group members to continue acting coop-
eratively in the social dilemma. Hence, if the latter type of use of rewards
is the dominant one, play in the PR and PF sessions should be identi-
cal. In the second alternative matching protocol, new groups are formed
randomly in every period (the so-called Stranger (S) matching protocol).
Here, tokens may be given as a reward for acting cooperatively in the social
dilemma stage, but such rewarding behavior can not be motivated by sub-
jects expecting to benefit themselves from their peers’ cooperative behavior
in future periods. So, whereas the 0SR, 1SR and 2SR treatments with PF
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matching are the most important ones, we also implement the two treat-
ments using PR and S matching protocols as they allow us to identify the
dominant motivation behind the use of reward tokens — if they are used at
all.
2.2 Experimental design
The experiments were conducted at Tilburg University’s CentER laboratory
in the Fall of 2008 and in the Spring of 2009. Subjects were students with
different nationalities and with backgrounds in business, economics, law, or
social sciences. Each subject participated in only one session. The experi-
mental parametrization of the game is given in Table 1, and Table 2 presents
the associated socially optimal and Nash equilibrium levels. Sessions lasted
roughly two hours, and average earnings were e15.96 including a e5 show-
up fee. All decisions were mediated via z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)).
Variable Description Value
N number of individuals per group 5
T number of periods of the stage game 15
w return on investments in the private activity 0.5
A parameter of the social dilemma’s revenue function 11.5
B parameter of the social dilemma’s revenue function 0.15
e individual endowment of effort 13
z individual endowment of ‘reward’ tokens 12
r value of reward tokens received 3
Table 1 Experiment parameterization.
In each session, subjects played the 0SR treatment as well as either
the 1SR or the 2SR treatment, and within a session all games were im-
plemented using the same matching protocol (Partner Fixed, Partner Ran-
dom, or Stranger). In the instructions participants were informed about
the matching process in their session, and games 0SR and 1SR/2SR were
referred to as Task 1 and Task 2, respectively. Participants were informed
that they would participate in two tasks, but they received the instructions
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Variable Description Value
x∗ symmetric individual socially optimal effort level 6
X∗ aggregate socially optimal effort level 30
xNE individual Nash equilibrium effort level 10
XNE aggregate Nash equilibrium effort level 50
pSO,sij indiv. socially optimal no. of reward tokens sent in every stage 12
pNE,sij indiv. Nash equilibrium no. of reward tokens sent in every stage 0
Table 2 Social optimum and Nash equilibrium values of all decision variables
for the given experiment parametrization.
for Task 2 only after Task 1 was finished.2 The tasks were framed neutrally.
The effort decision was described as ‘investing tokens in option 1 or 2’, where
the first represented the social dilemma activity and the second the outside
option (with constant marginal benefits w). In Task 1, subjects played 15
periods of 0SR. Subjects were shown equation (1), but they were also given
a payoff table in which they could look up, for every aggregate amount of
effort put in by the other group members, what payoffs they would earn for
a specific amount of effort invested. We did not inform the subjects about
the socially optimal or the Nash equilibrium effort levels. Before the start of
the experiment subjects were presented with a short test; the participants
answered all questions correctly without much difficulty.
After Task 1, the same sequence of events took place for Task 2, consist-
ing of 15 periods of either 1SR or 2SR. Participants were informed that after
having made the same decision as in Task 1 (allocating tokens to options 1
and 2), either one or two more decisions were to be made in every period —
depending on whether they were to play 1SR or 2SR. The decision(s) con-
sisted of allocating a budget of tokens between other group members and
themselves, where any token kept increased one’s payoffs by 1 point, and
any token given increased the recipient’s payoffs by 3 points. Hence, the
‘rewarding’ decision problems were framed neutrally too.
The information structure in every period of Task 1 (0SR) and Task 2
(1SR or 2SR) was as follows. At the end of stage 1 of Task 1, subjects were
informed about the individual effort decisions of all other group members,
2The instructions are available upon request from the authors.
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and about their associated profits. In Task 2, subjects received the same
information as in Task 1, but they were also informed, at the end of every
reward stage, about the number of reward tokens they had received from
other subjects as well as about the associated payoff consequences.
As explained above, 0SR followed by 2SR was implemented using three
different matching protocols (PF, PR and S) while 0SR followed by 1SR
was run just using the PF matching protocol. The four session types are
summarized in Table 3. Comparing 2SR across the three different matching
protocols allows us to better understand the mechanism giving rise to re-
warding behavior, and hence we will focus our attention on the 2SR results.
Session Subjects Groups Average Earnings
Partner, 1SR, fixed identity labels 50 11 e12.60
Partner, 2SR, fixed identity labels 50 10 e19.60
Partner, 2SR, random identity labels 55 11 e18.11
Stranger, 2SR 80 4 sessions e14.30
Table 3 Summary information on the number of participants and amounts of
money earned in the three session types.
3 Analysis of play in the PF sessions
The key question to be addressed in this question is whether the option to
send rewards increases efficiency in the multi-person social dilemma (stage
s1) – if subjects have the option to reciprocate not just to their peers’
behavior in s1, but also to rewards received in previous periods. If the option
to reward is introduced when using the Partner Fixed matching protocol, is
the resulting level of efficiency higher than absent any reward possibilities?
In this section we compare efficiency in 1SR and 2SR to that materializing
in 0SR.
In Figure 1(a) we present the aggregate effort (averaged over all groups)
in the social dilemma stage in periods 1-15 of the PF sessions, as well as
that in periods 16-30. Comparing the aggregate effort in 1SR-PF (averaged
over all 15 periods) to that in 0SR-PF, the relevant Wilcoxon test (with
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N1 = N2 = 11) yields a p-value of 0.28. Similarly, even when omitting the
first three periods of 0SR to account for learning, aggregate effort in 2SR
(averaged over all 15 periods) is not below that in 0SR (p = 0.58 according
to a Wilcoxon test with N1 = N2 = 10).3 Hence, these results indicate that
the opportunity to send reward tokens (whether it is just one opportunity
per period or two) does not affect efficiency in the social dilemma activity.
The only important difference between 1SR and 2SR is that in the latter
treatment average aggregate effort is essentially constant over periods 16-30
while in the 1SR treatment it takes longer for average effort to stabilize. In-
deed, in case of 2SR the difference in average aggregate effort levels between
periods 15 and 16 is not significant (N1 = N2 = 10, p = 0.72) while there
is a significant increase in cooperation when comparing effort in those two
periods in case of 1SR (N1 = N2 = 11, p = 0.056). However, even in 1SR
convergence is pretty quick because effort in periods 15 and 18 are already
statistically indistinguishable, and even though the fall in effort between
periods 15 and 16 is statistically significant, average effort in that period is
very close to the Nash equilibrium prediction (as it is equal to 9.6). Hence,
behavior in periods 16-30 is quite similar in 1SR and in 2SR, and efficiency
in either treatment is nog significantly different from that in 0SR.4
Thus, we find no evidence that adding one or two reward stages to a
standard public bad game increases efficiency in the social dilemma. This is
not due to subjects’ refusing to use the reward options in either 1SR or 2SR,
as standard game theory would predict. On the contrary, Figure 1(b) shows
that in period 16, on average, subjects give away between half (in s2 of
1SR) and two-thirds (in s2 of 2SR) of their endowment of reward tokens in
the relevant stage, and also that the number of reward tokens sent increases
over time – in case of s2 decisions in 2SR the number of reward tokens sent
3When including the first three periods of 0SR, average effort in the 2SR treatment
only just fails to be significantly higher than that in 0SR (p = 0.11).
4Indeed, the results of the 1SR-PF treatment are statistically indistinguishable from
those in 2SR-PF. For the null hypothesis of play in 1SR-PF and 2SR-PF being identical
the associated p-value for the average aggregate effort levels in periods 1-15 is equal to
0.756 (according to the relevant Mann-Whitney U test, with N1 = 11, N2 = 10), and for
the average aggregate effort level in periods 16-30 this test yields a p-value of 0.863.
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Figure 1 (a) Average aggregate effort in the social dilemma stage in the PF
sessions. (b) Average number of reward tokens sent per subject in stage 2 and
stage 3 in the PF sessions.
even approaches the maximum of 12 tokens as the game proceeds. And the
average number of reward tokens sent in s3 of every period of 2SR is only
just below that sent in s2 — except for the very last period. This gives rise
to the following three results.
Result 1 Behavior in the social dilemma stage of 1SR-PF and 2SR-PF
is, on average, even less cooperative than predicted by standard game
theory, but the average subject gives away more than half (two-thirds)
of her endowment of reward tokens in the first reward stage of 1SR
(2SR) in all periods.
Result 2 While efficiency in the social dilemma stage remains low in both
1SR-PF and 2SR-PF, the average number of tokens sent increases over
time in all reward stages.
Result 3 In 2SR-PF, the number of reward tokens sent in s3 is smaller
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than that sent in s2, but not substantially so (except for the very last
period).
Results 1 and 2 suggest that it is unlikely that the decision to send
reward tokens is motivated by a desire to compensate one’s peers for their
cooperative behavior in the social dilemma. Instead, the temporal increase
in rewards exchanged (result 2) and the fact that – in 2SR-PF – almost
an equal number of reward tokens are sent in the second reward stage as
in the first (result 3) suggest that subjects (i) recognize that exchanging
reward tokens is profitable, and (ii) base their decision to send reward tokens
more on the history of reward tokens received than on the development of
cooperation in the social dilemma stage.5
However, the above results are obtained on the basis of aggregate data,
and these may hide important differences at the individual level. For exam-
ple, it may be the case that individuals frequently change their decisions to
send reward tokens in response to changes in effort levels chosen by their
peers, with those decreasing (increasing) their effort levels facing an increase
(decrease) in the number of reward tokens received. Below, we present the
analyses for 2SR-PF.6
To test the hypothesis that subjects are unwilling to provide the second-
order public good of severing mutually profitable bilateral exchange rela-
tionships with free riders, we first analyze the persistence in the number of
rewards exchanged between subjects in 2SR-PF. We introduce the following
definition:
5The negligible difference in the number of reward tokens sent in s2 and s3 provides
additional evidence that play in 2SR-PF and 1SR-PF are very similar. When comparing
the number of reward tokens sent in the last reward stage of either treatment (that is, s2
in 1SR-PF and s3 in 2SR-PF), the p-value of the relevant Mann-Whitney U test equals
0.152 (with N1 = 11, N2 = 10).
6As suggested by Figure 1, behavior in 1SR-PF and 2SR-PF treatments are very
similar, and probing the data all the evidence suggests that the underlying mechanisms
are the same too. Because adjustment occurs faster in 2SR-PF than in 1SR-PF while
the second reward stage also allows us to better identify the underlying mechanism when
running alternative matching protocols (2SR-PR and 2SR-S; see section 4), we prefer
clarity to completeness, and focus our discussion of the results on just 2SR-PF. The
results for 1SR-PF are, however, available upon request.
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Definition Subjects i and j (j 6= i) are said to have a connection of length
τ in period t, measured by Connectionij,t = τ , if τ is the number of
periods between periods 16 and t in which i sent a strictly positive
number of reward tokens to j in both s2 and s3, and vice versa.
Figure 2(a) shows the frequency with which connections with a certain
duration occur in the data, evaluated in period 30. Although there are
quite a few short-run connections, the persistence in rewarding and coun-
terrewarding is remarkable. Almost fifty percent of all connections have a
length of 10-15 periods — all but one subject were involved in at least one
such a relationship. Consistent with intuition, Figure 2(b) indicates that
the number of tokens sent is larger the longer the connection is in place.7
(a) (b)
Figure 2 (a) Fraction of connections that last τ periods. (b) Average num-
ber of reward tokens sent between two subjects in a connection which lasts τ
periods.
We thus find that connections are long-lasting — even though efficiency
7The Spearman correlation coefficient between the length of the connection and the
average number of tokens sent is 0.90 in the first reward stage (N = 100, p < 0.01), and
0.91 for the second reward stage (N = 100, p < 0.01).
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in the social dilemma stage (s1) is poor. The persistence in ‘rewarding’
raises the question how connections are formed. What is the role of the
behavior in the social dilemma stage in every period? Is it really true that
the number of reward tokens received is independent of a subject’s effort
decisions? To analyze this, we use regression analysis to explain the number
of rewards sent in the two reward stages.
Let us first analyze the decisions of subject i to send reward tokens to
subject j (j 6= i) in the two reward stages of the first period (t = 16). The
key explanatory variables here are whether or not subject j acted cooper-
atively in the social dilemma stage of the first period. A natural bench-
mark is the average effort level of the N − 1 other subjects in a group;
x−j,t ≡∑i6=j(xi,t/(N − 1)). Let us define cooperation (non-cooperation) as
subjects choosing an effort level that is below (above) their group’s average
as measured by Max{0, x−j,t − xj,t} (Max{0, xj,t − x−j,t}). These variables
are included in the analysis of both s2 and s3. In addition, we also include
ps2ji,t=16 as an explanatory variable in s3 of period 16.
The results are reported in the first two columns of Table 4. Column (i)
shows that subjects are quite prone to sending reward tokens in s2 — as
evidenced by the magnitude of the intercept — but slightly less so to subjects
who put in more effort in the social dilemma stage than the average other
group member.8 Column (ii) shows that ps3ij,t is not directly affected by
subject j’s (relative) effort decision, but that it is larger the more reward
tokens subject j sent to subject i in s2 (ps2ji,t).
9
Next, we analyze behavior in the second period of 2SR (t = 17); see
columns (iii) and (iv) in Table 4. We use the same controls to explain ps2ij,t
as in columns (i) and (ii), but we also add the lagged number of rewards
received as explanatory variables (that is, ps3ji,t−1 in column (iii), and ps2ji,t−1
in column (iv)). The results are striking. The decision to send reward tokens
8The intercept is about 2. Because N − 1 = 4, subjects send, on average, 8 of their
12 reward tokens in s2, and only take off 0.24 reward tokens for every unit of effort other
subjects put in above the group’s average.
9Note that xi,t may affect p
s3
ij,t via p
s2
ji,t. However, this indirect effect is likely to be
small because of the relatively large intercept and the very low R2 of the s2 regression
presented in column (i).
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in both s2 and s3 is independent of the recipient’s behavior in s1, while the
coefficients on the number of rewards received in the previous reward stage
(ps3ji,t−1 in s2, and ps2ji,t−1 in s3) are positive and significant.
We replicate this analysis for the third period (t=18) and, arbitrarily,
for the tenth (t=25), and the same pattern emerges; see columns (v)-(viii)
in Table 4. Subject j’s behavior in s1 does not affect pij,t in s2 or s3; what
matters is the number of reward tokens received from j in the previous re-
ward stage. Additional support for this conclusion comes from the temporal
pattern of the magnitudes of the intercept, and of the specifications’ coef-
ficients of determination (R2). The ‘exogenous’ propensity to send reward
tokens decreases as the game proceeds, while the specification’s explanatory
power increases substantially.
We summarize these results as follows.
Result 4 In the regressions explaining ps2ij,t and p
s3
ij,t, we find that (i) effort
only affects rewarding decisions in t = 16, (ii) the coefficient on pji,t
in the previous reward stage increases over time while the ‘exogenous’
propensity to send reward tokens decreases, and (iii) the explanatory
power of past rewards received increases over time.
Hence, we conclude that the participants in the PF sessions do not use the
rewards to enforce cooperation in the social dilemma in 2SR-PF. Instead,
they use them to increase their own private earnings by establishing bilateral
exchange relationships. Similar patterns are observed in 1SR-PF — albeit
less clear cut. The key difference between 1SR-PF and 2SR-PF is that the
higher frequency of the option to send reward tokens speeds up the formation
of connections, but otherwise the qualitative results are the same.
4 Additional evidence on the motivation to use
reward tokens
We run 2SR using two alternative matching protocols, Partner Random
(PR) and Stranger (S). We do so to verify our conclusion that rewards are
20
not being used to enforce cooperation in the social dilemma, but also to
gain insight into the underlying mechanism. Subjects receive information
on their peers’ past behavior in neither the PR or S sessions, but they
can still base their decision to reward on their peers’ behavior in s1 — to
sustain (or enforce) future cooperation, or just to (non-strategically) reward
fellow group members’ kind actions in s1. Of course, because of the random
rematching between periods, subjects in the S sessions have less incentives
to send reward tokens than those in the PR and PF sessions — but they
may still decide to do so in 2SR. For that reason, we focus our attention on
the 2SR game rather than on that of 1SR. But in the 2SR-PF and 2SR-PR
sessions the incentives to reward are equally strong. In fact, if enforcement
and non-strategic rewarding are the main motivations behind the use of
reward tokens, play in all three stages of 2SR-PR should be identical to that
in 2SR-PF.
In Figure 3(a) we present the results of the average aggregate amount
of effort invested in s1 in the 2SR-PR and 2SR-S sessions, and the average
numbers of reward tokens sent in s2 and s3 are shown in Figure 3(b). For
ease of comparison we also include the results for the 2SR-PF sessions.
As stated above, play in the Fixed and Random Partner protocols should
be identical if reward tokens are used exclusively to enforce cooperation. The
data reject this hypothesis because the average aggregate effort in 2SR-PR
is below that in 2SR-PF (albeit marginally so because p = 0.105 according
to the relevant Mann-Whitney U test with N1 = 10, N2 = 11) while ps2ij,t
and ps3ij,t are significantly higher in 2SR-PF than in 2SR-PR (p < 0.001 in
both cases, as indicated by Mann-Whitney U tests with N1 = 10, N2 = 11).
Result 5 Even though the numbers of reward tokens sent in s2 and s3 in
2SR-PR are about half of those in 2SR-PF, efficiency in s1 of 2SR-PR
is higher than that in 2SR-PF.
So, play in the 2SR-PR and 2SR-PF sessions seems to differ, and hence
we turn to the question whether subjects in the 2SR-PR and 2SR-S sessions
send their reward tokens to the ones investing least in the social dilemma
stage — at least in period 16. We calculate the percentages of subjects
21
(a) (b)
Figure 3 (a) Average aggregate effort in the social dilemma stage in the 2SR-
PF, 2SR-PR and 2SR-S sessions. (b) Average number of reward tokens sent
per subject in stage 2 and stage 3 in the three matching protocols.
choosing to indiscriminately spread their rewards over all four other mem-
bers of their group (i.e., the opposite of selective use of reward tokens).
In the 2SR-PF and 2SR-S sessions these are 34 percent and 42 percent,
respectively, while only 16 percent of the subjects does so in the 2SR-PR
sessions.
Result 6 In s2 of period 16 of the 2SR-S sessions, no less than 40 percent
of the subjects sends an equal number of reward tokens to all four
other group members. In the 2SR-PR and 2SR-PF sessions these
percentages are respectively 16 and 34 percent, which means that the
use of reward tokens in the 2SR-PR sessions is more selective than
that in the 2SR-PF sessions.
Hence, we find that the option to send rewards is not used very selec-
tively in the S sessions (Result 6). Also, the play in the 2SR-PF and 2SR-PR
sessions are not identical because (i) efficiency in s1 of 2SR-PR only just
22
fails to be significantly higher than that in 2SR-PF while the number of
reward tokens sent in s2 and s3 are significantly lower (Result 5), and (ii)
the decision to send rewards in the 2SR-PR sessions is substantially more
selective (Result 6). These observations do not support the hypothesis that
reward tokens are used to enforce cooperation in the social dilemma stage.
However, they also send a conflicting message. Result 6 suggests that sub-
jects in 2SR-S try to find partners willing to reciprocate to rewards received
within the same period, while Result 5 suggests that there is a real effi-
ciency improvement associated with the more selective use of reward tokens
in 2SR-PR. In the remainder of this section we try to reconcile these two
results.
Let us first have a closer look at the subjects’ individual behavior in
the social dilemma stage in each of the three session types. The average
variances in effort within groups over periods 16-30 are 2.1, 2.5 and 1.9 in
the PF, PR and S sessions of 2SR, respectively. The within-group variance is
highest in 2SR-PR10, and closer inspection of the temporal pattern (available
upon request) reveals that it does not really decline over time either. Thus,
we find an important difference in play between 2SR-PF and 2SR-PR. While
effort decisions and the number of rewards sent should be identical if the
predominant use of rewards is to sustain cooperation in the social dilemma,
we find that convergence to symmetric effort levels is least strong in 2SR-PR.
Result 7 Compared to the other two session types in 2SR, we find that in
2SR-PR the within-group variance in effort remains highest.
To further explore the differences in within-group convergence of effort
levels between the three matching protocols, we calculate (i) the number of
periods in which a subject chooses a particular effort level in each of the
three session types, and (ii) conditional on choosing the same effort level for
a number of periods, what effort level was chosen. The results are shown in
Figure 4(a) and Figure 4(b), respectively.
10Using a Mann-Whitney test (N1 = N2 = 15), the variance in 2SR-PR is significantly
higher than in 2SR-PF and 2SR-S at p < 0.01 in both cases.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4 (a) Fraction of subjects who choose the same effort level in s1 for
8 periods or more in 2SR. (b) Distribution of effort levels chosen by subjects
who choose the same effort level for 12 periods or more.
Figure 4(a) presents the frequency of subjects choosing the same effort
level for eight periods or more in the 2SR treatment. Again, we find impor-
tant differences in play between 2SR-PR on the one hand, and 2SR-PF and
2SR-S on the other. Almost 50 percent of the subjects in 2SR-PR choose
the same effort level for 12 periods (out of a maximum of 15) or more, while
the numbers in 2SR-PF and 2SR-S are 32 and 35 percent, respectively. Con-
ditional on choosing the same effort level for 12 periods or more, Figure 4(b)
presents the distribution of effort levels chosen. In total, 64 percent of the
subjects in 2SR-PR pick effort levels strictly below the Nash equilibrium
level (x ≤ 9), while the subjects of 2SR-S and 2SR-PF are clearly overrepre-
sented at effort levels above the Nash equilibrium (x ≥ 10), with frequencies
of 82 percent and 81 percent, respectively.
Result 8 Compared to the other two session types, subjects in 2SR-PR
revise their effort decisions less frequently, and they also tend to choose
lower effort levels.
24
So we find that in 2SR-PR (i) the within-group variance in effort re-
mains highest (Result 7), (ii) the within-subject variance of effort is lowest
(Result 8), (iii) the use of reward tokens in s2 is most selective (Result 6),
and (iv) efficiency in s1 is highest (Result 5). Combined with the fact that
ps2ij,t and p
s3
ij,t in 2SR-PR remain fairly constant (see Figure 3(b)), one ex-
planation might be that subjects use their effort decisions in s1 to signal
their identity to overcome the problem of subject identifiers being reshuﬄed
between periods — in order to still be able to establish mutually profitable
bilateral exchange relationships. We offer two pieces of evidence for this: (i)
non-parametric tests regarding reciprocity in the number of reward tokens
sent between ‘signalers’, and (ii) regression analyses aimed at explaining the
use of reward tokens in s2 and s3. Let us first define a ‘signaler’:
Definition A ‘signaler’ in 2SR-PR is a subject who chooses the same effort
level in s1 for twelve periods or more.11
Our first piece of evidence supporting our signalling hypothesis is the
way in which two signalers exchange reward tokens. If tokens are used as
a way to sustain cooperation in the social dilemma or to non-strategically
reward ‘good behavior’ in s1, one expects the ‘partner’ with a higher (lower)
effort level in the social dilemma stage to give more (fewer) reward tokens
than the other ‘partner’. If subjects simply view their partner’s effort level
as a signal of their identity, there would be no systematic difference in the
number of reward tokens sent by the two partners.
We test this by analyzing the number of reward tokens exchanged be-
tween all pairs of signalers with unequal effort levels. In neither s2 nor s3
can we reject the null hypothesis of no difference in the average number of
rewards sent by either partner, with p-values of 0.33 and 0.61 respectively,
according to the relevant Wilcoxon tests (with N1 = N2 = 20).
Result 9 Differences in effort levels chosen by two ‘signalers’ in 2SR-PR do
not affect the net flow of reward tokens exchanged.
11All conclusions are robust against using other cutoffs — results available upon request.
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Second, we try to explain ps2ij,t and p
s3
ij,t in 2SR-PR using a similar
setup as reported in Table 4. The controls used for stage 1 behavior are
Max{0, x−j,t − xj,t} and Max{0, xj,t − x−j,t}. Also, the variable p2ji,t is in-
cluded in the regressions for stage 3. This variable measures the direct
reciprocity among subjects within periods. However, in contrast to the PF
sessions (both 1SR and 2SR), subjects cannot directly reciprocate the num-
ber of reward tokens received between periods because identity labels are
changed between periods. Therefore, we have included variables that cap-
ture the signaling mechanism that subjects may use. The first variable is
I(Signalj,t), which has a value of 1 if the effort level of subject j in period
t, xj,t, has been among the effort levels that subject i observed in period
t − 1.12 Clearly, if this variable shows up significantly, the data provide
support for the hypothesis that effort levels are used to signal one’s identity.
We also calculate I(Signalj,t) × xj,t to check whether the strength of the
signal is inversely related to the level chosen: the lower the signal, the more
costly it is, and hence the more trustworthy the signaller may be. Finally, we
have included the interaction term I(Signalj,t) × p3j,t−1. This variable links
current rewarding with the number of reward tokens subject i has received
in stage 3 of the previous period from a group member who potentially is a
signaler. We report the results of periods 17, 18, 19, and 25 in Table 5.13
The results are as follows. First, subjects seem to condition their stage 2
and stage 3 rewards on stage 1 behavior in the 2SR-PR sessions, as opposed
to the 2SR-PF sessions where stage 1 behavior had no effect at all. However,
the economic importance of this mechanism is quite small. In many periods
the coefficients on the s1 variables fail to be statistically significant, and if
12That means that I(Signalj,t) = 1 if xj,t = {x1,t−1, x2,t−1, ..., x5,t−1}, and zero oth-
erwise. Hence, I(Signalj,t) = 1 if xj,t = x1,t−1, but because subjects have no means
of inferring other subjects’ identities other than by their effort decisions, the signalling
variable is also equal to 1 if a subject chooses the same effort level – accidentally, or on
purpose – as one (or more) of their fellow group members in the previous period.
13We do not include period 16 (as done in Table 5) in Table 5 because of the lagged
variables in the regression analysis. We did run the same regression as in columns (i)
and (ii) of that table for period 16, and we find that stage 1 behavior has a significant
impact on stage 2 rewarding, but not on stage 3. The magnitude of these variables are
comparable to those reported in Table 5. The variable p2ji is highly significant and has a
value of 0.70.
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they are, s1 behavior tends to increase or decrease the number of rewards
received in either stage 2 or stage 3 with less than one token (because |x−j,t−
xj,t| ≤ 1 in about 78 percent of the cases).
Second, the dummy variable I(Signalj,t) increases in magnitude as the
game progresses when it comes to stage 2 rewards. The same holds for
the interaction term I(Signalj,t)×xj,t: subjects choosing higher effort levels
as a signal tend to attract fewer reward tokens than signalers with lower
effort levels. All in all, this means that signalers attract more reward tokens
than non-signalers, but that it takes some periods before the subjects learn
that signaling is a profitable strategy. Note that in stage 3, the magnitude
and significance of these signaling variables tend to be small. This makes
intuitive sense, because in s3 subjects have a direct test of a group member’s
trustworthiness: the number of reward tokens received in stage 2 (p2ji,t). This
variable is large and highly significant in s3 in all periods, comparable to
the results of the 2SR-PF sessions. The importance of the variable (p2ji,t) is
reflected in two other ways. The coefficients of determination (R2) in the
regressions for stage 3 rewarding are much greater than those of stage 2,
and the constant term becomes insignificant in stage 3, implying that the
exogenous propensity to reward as observed in stage 2 is no longer present.
Third, further evidence that signaling is profitable comes from the pos-
itive sign of the coefficient on I(Signalj,t)× p3ji,t−1 — subjects try to recip-
rocate reward behavior between periods. However, as expected and in line
with the signaling hypothesis, this variable tends to be insignificant in the
s3 regressions.
We summarize our findings as follows:
Result 10 In the regression explaining p2ij,t and p
3
ij,t in 2SR-PR, we find
that (i) stage 1 effort has only a very weak impact on the number of
rewards received, (ii) subjects who signal their identity by choosing the
same effort level as in the previous period receive more reward tokens,
(iii) a large part of the variation in stage 3 rewarding is explained by
p2ji,t which shows that subjects use reward tokens mainly as a way to
bilaterally profit from an exchange of rewards, and (iv) for signalers,
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p3ji,t−1 is positive and significant in s2 rewarding behavior.
5 Discussion and conclusions
In society, behavior of agents is embedded in a system of interpersonal rela-
tions where individual welfare depends on activities that require multilateral
cooperation, and also on alternative economic activities that only require bi-
lateral cooperation (Granovetter (1985), Bowles & Gintis (2002)). Examples
of the former are common property resources like fish or water, and examples
of the latter include helping others harvesting their crops, and child mind-
ing. Ideally all agents cooperate in both types of activities; in a less ideal
world, refusing to cooperate bilaterally (that is, withholding ‘rewards’) can
be used as an instrument to enforce cooperation in the multi-person social
dilemma.
In this paper we experimentally test whether indeed ‘rewards’ can sustain
cooperation in a multi-person social dilemma. We implement a non-linear
public bad game with two stages in which subjects have the option to send
‘reward tokens’ to their fellow group members. We implement three different
matching protocols (Partner Fixed, Partner Random and Stranger). All
three allow subjects to condition their rewarding decisions in both reward
stages on their peers’ behavior in the social dilemma stage of the period, but
also, in the second reward stage, on the number of rewards received from
their peers in the first rewarding stage. Compared to the Partner Random
sessions, there is less reason in the Stranger sessions to reciprocate to either
decision of one’s peers, while in the Partner Fixed sessions (in both 1SR
and 2SR) subjects can take into account the entire history of their peers’
decisions — not just those taken in the current period.
The results of our laboratory experiments suggest that having the op-
tion to selectively increase (or not to increase) one’s fellow group mem-
bers’ welfare does not increase efficiency in the multi-agent social dilemma.
While efficiency in the social dilemma stage in the PF sessions remains low
throughout the experiment in both 1SR and 2SR, the propensity to send
reward tokens increases over time. We find that this increased propensity
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to send rewards is due to subjects positively reciprocating to the number of
reward tokens received from fellow group members in the previous reward
stage (either in the current or in the previous period), while decisions in
the social dilemma stage are found to play a role in the first period only.
Subjects’ propensity to positively reciprocate to their peers’ bilateral activ-
ities is larger than their propensity to negatively reciprocate to their peers’
behavior in the social dilemma.
Additional support from this claim comes from the analysis of play in
2SR when using the Stranger and Partner Random matching protocols.
Even when new groups are created at the beginning of every new period (in
the 2SR-S sessions), a substantial share of the participants equally divide
whatever number of reward tokens they give over all four other members of
their group — independent of their peers’ behavior in the social dilemma.
And if enforcement were the main motivation to use rewards, play in the two
Partner matching protocols (2SR-PF and 2SR-PR) should be identical. To
be able and willing to use rewards to enforce cooperation, subjects need to
be (i) ensured of future interactions with the same subjects, and (ii) able to
observe the behavior of one’s peers in the social dilemma stage of the current
period. These conditions are met in both the Partner Fixed and Partner
Random sessions, but still we find marked differences in play between the
two — the drive to engage in the exchange of reward tokens is so strong
that subjects actually use their decisions in the social dilemma to signal
their identity in the Partner Random sessions.
So, from the analysis of play in all three session types we find that sub-
jects attach more weight to establishing bilateral cooperation in the reward
stages than to affecting their peers’ behavior in the social dilemma stage.
These conclusions are diametrically opposite of those drawn by Vyrastekova
& van Soest (2008) and Rand et al. (2009a), even though our design is close
to the ones developed in these studies. However, Vyrastekova & van Soest
(2008) note that cooperation decays over time in their experiment — having
two reward options per period (in our setup) rather than one (as in theirs)
just speeds up this process. And in Rand et al. (2009a), subjects can decide
to incur a cost of 4 points to increase the payoffs of a fellow group member
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by 12 points, yes or no, and this decision can be made separately for each of
the other members of one’s group. That means that subjects need to elicit
bilateral cooperation of all their peers to maximize their returns from the
‘reward activity’ while in our setup establishing a bilateral exchange with
one (trustworthy) subject suffices. Indeed, in our experiment subjects can
always find a subject whose behavior in the social dilemma is close to theirs,
and still achieve maximum efficiency in the ‘reward activity’ independent of
how they themselves behave in the social dilemma. That means that the
‘carrot’ loses its bite — it can be reaped by all, not by just those who act
cooperatively in the social dilemma.
We conclude that rewards are unlikely to sustain cooperation in real-
world multi-person social dilemmas. Unlike the predictions of standard game
theory this is not due to the fact that agents are unwilling to cooperate. On
the contrary: agents are too eager to cooperate in small-scale settings — so
eager that they do so at the expense of the larger-scale social dilemma.
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